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time period spans the insolvency ofthe guarantor and two subsequent recapitalizations. These extraordinary events affected the risk perception of the FSLIC both positively and negatively.
We find that despite the FSLIC being a government guarantor and assumed by some to be riskless, when the market preception of its credit quality declined, interest premiums on CDs increased.1
The high premium CDs in the market at the time were a matter of public policy concern because it was assumed that risky firms spread risk to other firms, resulting in high premiums throughout the industry (Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal (1989), Kane (1987) , and White (1991)). To prevent this, the FSLIC moved to resolve the institutions issuing these CDs.2 We find, however, that it was the risk perception of the guarantor, not risk contagion among firms, that caused high premiums to emerge.
We proceed by presenting a general model of rates on third party guaranteed debt that examines how the market prices both firm and guarantor risk. Firm risk is measured by the probability of firm insolvency and guarantor risk by the depositor's expected cost of an incomplete guarantor payoff. In Section II, we state two propositions that summarize the influence of guarantor risk on both CD rate premiums and the interfirm spreads in CD premiums. In Section III, we use a cross-section time-series model to provide estimates of firm and guarantor risk.
In Section IV, we derive for each month the probabilities of insolvency for what we define as junk, median, and prime firms, and examine the evidence of risk contagion among these firms. We also examine changes in guarantor risk over time and the relationship of risk to movements in premiums and spreads. Section V contains the summary and conclusions.
II. The Model of Deposit Premiums
We develop a model of guaranteed or insured debt and demonstrate how the firm's and guarantor's risk interact to produce a premium rate above the riskless rate. Although the third party is a government-sponsored agency, rates on an insured deposit reflect the probability that the federal government will not make a complete payout of principal and interest.
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, we express the one-period rate on guaranteed debt paid by a given firm as where i is a firm's one-period guaranteed debt rate, R is the one-period risk-free rate, / is the event that the firm becomes insolvent, and c\f is the event that a complete/costless guarantor payoff is made following an insolvency and nonpayment by the firm. pf is the discrete probability of firm insolvency, pc\ f and pt\ f are *For example, Shoven, Smart, and Waldfogel (1992) consider the guarantee to be riskless and as a result all CDs are assumed to be perfect riskless substitutes. Whether the market considers a government guarantor to be riskless is explored in this paper.
2The FHLBB attempted to restrain deposit premiums and apply rate ceilings by regulating brokered deposits for firms with low capital. Resolution took a number of forms, including assisted mergers, acquisitions, receiverships, and liquidation. the discrete probabilities of the guarantor either making complete or incomplete payoffs, and Lty is the investor's expected cost per dollar of deposits in the event of firm insolvency and an incomplete guarantor payoff. The probabilities pcy and Pi\f sum to one. Equation (1) indicates that the investor receives the promised one dollar when the firm or institution is solvent (term 1) or when the guarantor makes a complete/costless payoff (term 2). When the firm is insolvent and the guarantor makes an incomplete payoff, the investor receives a net payment of one dollar less the expected loss, Lt\f (term 3).
Since we analyze insolvency risk, measured by the rate premium over the riskless rate, we reformulate the model. Taking logs and simplifying equation ( The relative premium depends on the firm's insolvency risk pf and terms having to do with the CD investor's losses if there is an incomplete guarantor payoff. By combining terms, the relative premium has the desirable property of being defined only in terms of firm and guarantor risk. Following a firm insolvency, the government guarantor controls whether there will be an incomplete payment by the guarantor, p^f, and, if so, how large a loss per deposit dollar the depositor will incur, Lt\f. We condense the combined effect ofthe contingent probability of an incomplete settlement and the contingent expected loss into an expected cost per deposit dollar, gjy, a variable that ranges from zero to one. The expression is consistent with terms of the deposit insurance contract. In this contract, the insolvent firm does not settle with the depositor. Instead, the guarantor impounds the remaining assets of the firm in order to make payment to the depositor. Since investors look solely to the guarantor for compensation, gt^ represents the risk of a loss imposed by the guarantor.
It is reasonable to assume that the guarantor treats the insured losses of all firms' guaranteed deposits the same.3 Therefore, the guarantor risk term (while 3 An example of difference in treatment by size is a policy known as "too big to fail." This policy may have affected the pricing of noninsured deposits and nondeposit debt of some commercial banks at the time. However, in this study, we analyze insured deposits issued by thrifts with a maximum deposit size of $80,000, within the $100,000 deposit insurance coverage limit. Generally, the guarantor is neither completely worthless nor perfectly riskless. However, if it were riskless, ^ would be 0 and the CDs of all firms would be priced in the same risk(less) class despite differences in firms' probabilities of insolvency.
In the typical case, ^ assumes a small but positive value and there is a spectrum of premiums corresponding to different levels of firm risk.
Before we can discuss implications for the interfirm spread in premiums, we need to identify a "junk" firm and "prime" firm. We define the "junk"firm as a firm for which there is a relatively high probability of insolvency (pj), and a "prime" firm as one with a relatively low probability of insolvency (pp). We state the spread relationship between the junk and prime firms' premiums in the following proposition.
Premium Spread Proposition. For a constant difference in firm probabilities of insolvency (pj ? pp), the spread in the relative premium between the prime and junk firm is proportional to guarantor risk.
We demonstrate the proposition in the following manner: any two levels of guarantor risk are given by % and \Pkr such that \Pkr is k times the level of \Pr. The relative premium spread for the first level of guarantor risk is given by (pp ?pj)%. For the second level of guarantor risk, the relative premium spread is (pp ? Pj)\Pkr> which is equal to k(pp -Pj)%. Thus, the spread in the relative premium between the prime and junk firms is proportional to guarantor risk. The absolute premium is also proportional to both firm and guarantor risk because 1 + R is a constant and the same across all firms for each point in time.
Therefore, the propositions apply also for the absolute premium. An implication of the two propositions is that premium levels and premium spreads are proportional to each other so that as guarantor risk increases, the premium levels and spreads both rise simultaneously. We will address this issue in the empirical section of the paper. 4 There is some lack of clarity in the literature regarding insolvency and closure of an insolvent institution. Typically, they are equated. The empirical literature has made estimates of "failure" based on logit or probit procedures that relate accounting data to actual insolvencies (Sinkey (1979), Martin (1977), Barth, et al. (1985) , and Gajewski (1989)). We measure ex ante market probabilities of the event occuring whether or not the event subsequently occurs. In addition, we differentiate between insolvency and closure. The derived estimates of the firm's probability of insolvency, pf, reflect the depositor's assessment that the deposit insurer will judge the firm to be insolvent. At that juncture, the deposit insurer will garnish the firm's assets and accept the obligation of satisfying the insured depositors. The guarantor will then choose to either close, liquidate, sell, or subsidize the firm. Since the choice of the method of resolution might inflict different costs on the depositor, the prospect for closure as a method of resolution should be reflected in the W term.
III. The Regression
5 The data are primarily from the state of California but also include other states in the FHLB region, all of which allow statewide branching. Market structure variables are not essential because the state is, effectively, a market. 6Instead of using the monthly dummy variable to measure guarantor risk, it would be possible to attempt to account for the factors that affect guarantor risk. This could be done by first measuring guarantor risk with a dummy variable. Then, other variables that measure the government's willingness and ability to honor the guarantee might be introduced as regressors on the dummy variable. Alternatively, we could substitute macro or other variables for the dummy variables, thereby, producing sets of monthly coefficients against each macro variable. Over the entire 20-month period, renewed confidence in the guarantee followed two waves of pessimism. On January 21, 1987, Federal Home Loan Bank Board Chairman Edwin Gray declared that the FSLIC lacked funds to cover loans to thrifts. Shortly, thereafter, the GAO declared the FSLIC to 12Deposit premiums should measure the difference between the risky and riskless CD yield. There? fore, we rescale the Treasury security yield to reflect the same special features as a riskless CD. The model calls for measuring the difference or premium between the firm's risky CD rate and the rate on a riskless CD. One observes the pricing of riskless Treasury securities but not riskless CDs. The riskless CD has greater convenience, lower transaction costs, and a smaller minimum size and divisibility than the Treasury. The CD also contains a put option. That is, though the CD is a term instrument with fixed maturity, the holder has the right to put the CD back to the issuer prior to its maturity date at face value, sometimes with a penalty. The riskless CD advantages are partially offset by Treasury tax shields from state income tax exclusions.
To adjust the Treasury yield, we impose the constraint that a risky CD yield should not be less than the riskless CD benchmark. Through a process of iteration, we adjust the Treasury yield downward one basis point at a time and reestimate the regressions and the derived results for each iteration. The bottom row of Table 4 Guarantor risk, &, is the depositor's expected costs from an incomplete guarantor pay? off. These expected cost estimates are derived from the set of dummy variables in the regression equation, rn = [a0 + a^AP + ... + a^lNTWOKb/^) + en, where rn is the nth institution's relative premium, the an with n = 0, 13 are the firm risk regression coefficients, the bk with k = 1, 20 are coefficients of the monthly dummy variables Dk, and en is the error term. We calculate firm probabilities of insolvency monthly from the value of the firm variables for that month (the bracketed terms of the regression equation). Then, for each cross-section, we generate a frequency distribution of the probability of firm insolvency in order to distinguish the junk, median, and prime firms for the industry for that month. For a given month, we define the firm at the bottom one percentile of insolvency risk to be the prime firm, and the firm at the 99th percentile to be the junk firm. Additionally, we define the firm at the 50th percentile to be the median (or representative) firm. TABLE 3 for each cross-section, we generate a frequency distribution of the probability of firm insolvency in order to distinguish the junk, median, and prime firms for the industry for that month. For a given month, we define the firm at the bottom one percentile of insolvency risk to be the prime firm and the firm at the 99th percentile to be the junk firm. Additionally, we define the firm at the 50th percentile to be the median (or representative) firm. Table 2 Table 4 reports the calculated absolute premiums for the junk, median, and prime firms as well as the spreads across these premiums. We calculate the absolute premium as the product of the firm probability of insolvency and the cost of an incomplete guarantor payout as specified in equation ( The absolute premiums and spreads vary considerably over the 20 reported months. Since the firm probabilities of insolvency remain relatively stable, varia? tions in guarantor risk are largely responsible for the changes in both the premium levels and spreads (see Figures 1B and 2B and Table 2 ). Furthermore, the changes in premiums and spreads occur concurrently. Since the junk firm probability coefficient (0.242) is 85 percent higher than the prime firm probability coefficient (0.131), any increase in guarantor risk increases the junk premium 85 percent more than the prime premium.
Figures 1B and 2B demonstrate the correspondence ofthe absolute premiums and spreads to guarantor risk. Additionally, Figure 3 shows the premium (for the median firm) and the junk-prime spread in descending order of guarantor risk by month. The close correspondence of the premiums and spreads illustrates the extent to which the We calculate the absolute premium as the product of the firm probability of insolvency and the cost of an incomplete guarantor payout.
guarantor simultaneously generated the premiums and spreads during our sample period.
V. Summary and Conclusions
We show that the premiums on guaranteed debt are multiplicatively related to firm risk and guarantor risk. When firm risk is constant, the premiums as well as spreads are proportional to guarantor risk. Our model and data indicate that homogeneous debt issued by different issuers with the same guarantor are not perfect substitutes in market pricing except in the special case of a riskless guarantor. In this special case, differences in firm risk do not affect market pricing. However, a rate spread should generally exist in the market for guaranteed debt.
Empirical evidence of rate spreads attests to the presence of guarantor risk, even in the case of a federal government guarantor.
The empirical evidence demonstrates that the risk ofthe industry's prime and median firm held steady over the 20 cross-sections examined, while the risk ofthe industry's junk firm increased over time. Guarantor risk varied over a wide range and embodied two waves of pessimism. We found the pattern of FSLIC guarantor risk to be common to other government guarantees. Deterioration in guarantor risk had, on average, an 85 percent greater effect on the industry's junk firm premium Acting on the government's contagion thesis, the federal guarantor restrained junk firms from paying high CD premiums and resolved them quickly in order to prevent the large junk CD premiums from infecting the prime firms' CDs.
We find no statistical evidence of a relationship between the industry's junk and prime firms' probabilities of insolvency. The contagion thesis is predicated on the mistaken appearance of junk-prime contagion resulting from the simultaneous increase of junk and prime premiums in response to the common influence ofthe unobserved but elevated guarantor risk. The evidence does not reveal generalized contagion of risk pricing among firms.
